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CONSTITUTIONAL LAWYERS AND THE 





The power of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) to 
shape government behavior varies greatly from country to country. All states 
subject to the Court’s jurisdiction accept its authority to adjudicate disputes, 
and all take at least some meaningful steps toward judgment compliance. Even 
the Chávez government, despite loudly campaigning against the Inter-American 
System (IAS) and eventually removing Venezuela from the Court’s jurisdiction, 
occasionally paid victims pursuant to Court orders.1 But in some states the 
Court’s judgments play a far greater role: they are untethered from the 
particular dispute that gives rise to them and take on a life as law-like rules that 
guide the subsequent behavior of public actors and the outcomes of disputes 
that never reach the Court. In some states the Court’s judgments even come to 
shape policymaking and public debates, constraining the range of options that 
are put on the table. The Colombian Constitutional Court, for example, 
regularly reviews national laws for compatibility with the American Convention 
on Human Rights as interpreted by the IACtHR.2 And actors from all sides of 
Colombia’s currently unfolding peace process—from the uribistas who oppose it 
to the guerrilla leadership that is negotiating it—refer to IACtHR rulings as 
they debate whether and how to prosecute war crimes.3 
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 1. See infra Part V. 
 2. See infra Part III. 
 3. Jorge Cubides, Comunicado sobre el proceso de paz, CENTRO DEMOCRÁTICO, July 15, 2013, 
http://www.centrodemocratico.com/comunicado-sobre-el-proceso-de-paz/ (Uribista document citing the 
IACtHR); Las Farc reclamaron el derecho de los pueblos a la paz y a la participación ciudadana en el 
proceso de paz, AGENCIA PRENSA RURAL, Feb. 21, 2013, http://prensarural.org/spip/ 
spip.php?article10286 (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia statement that refers to the 
IACtHR). 
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This article demonstrates that variation of the Inter-American Court’s 
authority across states can be explained in great part by the practice of 
constitutional law in each state. This is not to say that differences in 
constitutional texts explain the variation. Rather, the article suggests that for the 
Court’s authority to expand beyond mere judgment compliance, two factors 
other than the black-letter law must be in place. The first factor is the presence 
of lawyers—be they scholars, judges, public-interest lawyers, or other 
practitioners—who adhere to and promote a particular vision of constitutional 
law as containing within it international human rights law. The Inter-American 
Court opened its doors in 1979, during the era of military dictatorships in Latin 
America. Starting in 1988, many Latin American countries enacted new 
constitutions. During this more democratic era, new theories that foreground 
judicial power, higher-law rights review, and constitutions open to international 
standards began to spread. There now exists in the region a transnational 
network of lawyers who advance a liberal vision of constitutional law that 
emphasizes judicial power, rights-based review, and Dworkinian-style 
interpretive practices, and who embrace the view that constitutional rights are 
grounded not only in positive domestic law but also in international human 
rights instruments.4 Typically labeled neoconstitutionalism, such theories help 
provide a platform for expanding the Inter-American Court’s authority.5 
But the spread of neoconstitutionalist ideas throughout Latin America does 
not explain why the IACtHR’s authority varies by country. The second factor 
explaining this variation is that those who advance these ideas must have 
political impact at the national level: they must be able to forge alliances with 
legislative and executive reformers who adopt the movement’s vision of law and 
advance it as part of their own project of political reform. In seeking to 
understand the rise of a unified Europe, the rise of the New Deal in the United 
States, and other “transformations that are at the same time political and legal,” 
Yvez Dezalay and Bryant Garth argue that it is important to broaden the 
analysis to include not only the legal field but also the interaction of the 
struggles that unfold in the legal field with those that unfold in the political 
field.6 Their observation proves relevant in the Inter-American setting: it is 
where neoconstitutionalists gain political momentum and participate in the 
construction of a new domestic constitutional order, as in Colombia, that the 
Court’s authority expands beyond judgment compliance and comes to shape 
 
 4.  As used here, “liberal” refers not to progressive politics but to political theories that prioritize 
liberty and view rights as a constraint on the exercise of government power. Richard Hudelson, 
MODERN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 37–38 (1999). 
5.    Neoconstitutionalism is a contested term. In this article, it will be used as it is defined in part I, 
infra.  For alternative uses, see generally Pedro Salazar Ugarte, Garantismo y neoconstitucionalismo 
frente a frente: algunas claves para su distinción, 34 DOXA, CUADERNOS DE FILOSOFÍA DEL DERECHO 
289 (2011). 
 6.  Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Lawyers and the Transformations of the Fields of State 
Power: Osmosis, Hysteresis and Aggiornamento, in LAW AND THE FORMATION OF MODERN EUROPE: 
PERSPECTIVES FROM THE HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 275–307 (Mikael Rask Madsen & Chris 
Thornhill eds., 2014). 
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state behavior outside the confines of a particular dispute. But where 
neoconstitutionalism does not have political influence—either because there is 
little constitutional change (as in Chile) or because the constitutional change 
that does take place moves away from neoconstitutionalist premises and liberal 
political values (as in Venezuela)—the Court’s authority does not expand in the 
same way. Throughout the region, then, the IACtHR’s authority takes on 
different shapes depending in great part on national constitutional practices and 
constitutional politics. 
In order to explore and further develop this hypothesis, this article 
delineates the relation of neoconstitutionalist lawyers to emerging 
constitutional practices in three states that show variation in the type of 
authority the IACtHR exerts. In Colombia, the Court has achieved the 
relatively rare type of authority Alter, Helfer, and Madsen call “extensive”: the 
Court consistently shape[s] law and politics on certain issues.7 In Chile, the 
IACtHR has “narrow authority,” which refers to judgment compliance, and 
“intermediate authority,” which arises when compliance partners, or state 
officials who have the power to comply with the Court’s rulings, do so at least 
sometimes. In Venezuela, by contrast, the Court has achieved only narrow 
authority.8 For each of these three countries, this article begins by exploring the 
role of neoconstitutionalist lawyers in recent constitutional change. It then links 
the role played by these lawyers to the particular type of authority that the 
IACtHR exerts in each state. Alternative explanations for the shape that the 
Court’s authority takes in each state are also considered. 
By drawing a link between lawyers and constitutional change to the 
authority of the IACtHR, this article offers several contributions to the study of 
international court (IC) authority. It highlights variation across states and 
reveals the role of epistemic communities and domestic legal practice in shaping 
IC authority. More specifically, it contributes a theory of the relationship 
between human rights courts, lawyers, and constitutional regimes that may be 
relevant to understanding other transnational human rights orders. Within the 
study of the IAS, those who have written about constitutional law and the 
Court’s influence in the domestic realm have tended to focus exclusively on 
legal doctrine.9 The article shows that consideration of the politics behind 
judicial change provides a deeper understanding of when and how legal 
doctrine contributes to judicial change. 
Part II introduces the IACtHR and discusses how it first established its 
authority. It then explains the link between the variation in the Court’s 
authority, neoconstitutionalism, and political reform. The three case studies 
follow in parts III, IV and V. Each examines the relation of neoconstitutionalist 
 
 7.  Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer & Mikael Rask Madsen, How Context Shapes the 
Authority of International Courts, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016, at 10–11. 
 8.  See infra Part V. 
 9.  Alexandra Huneeus, Human Rights between Jurisprudence and Social Science, 28 LEIDEN J. OF 
INT’L LAW 255, 257–60 (2015). 
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lawyers to the field of domestic politics in recent moments of constitutional 
change and shows how that relation, in turn, explains the type of authority the 
IACtHR exerts. The final part traces the influence of neoconstitutionalists on 
the IACtHR itself and reveals the Court’s role in advancing a particular vision 
of constitutional law that enhances its authority. 
II 
THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT AND NEOCONSTITUTIONALISM 
The OAS was created at the close of World War II and includes all the 
states of the Western Hemisphere. In 1959, prompted by the Cuban Revolution 
and other Cold War dynamics, the OAS created the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, based in Washington, D.C.  The Commission 
soon invented itself as a proactive defender of human rights: through its 
handling of regional crises, such as the Dominican Republic’s internal crisis of 
1965, it earned the respect of many states.10 During the 1960s and 1970s, several 
of the region’s democracies fell to military dictatorships that engaged in covert 
but massive, human rights violations. In response, the Commission began to 
engage in on-site visits through which it would carefully document the 
systematic atrocities taking place.11 Through its work during this difficult period, 
the Commission established a reputation as the “only real refuge” for victims of 
state atrocity.12 
The Court opened its doors in 1979—a decade after the American 
Convention,13 and two decades after the Commission began its work. The 
Court’s early docket also focused on the topic of state-sanctioned acts of 
violence against civilian populations: through 2000, all but two cases decided by 
the Court dealt with illegal state violence. This subject-matter focus was not a 
deliberate strategy of the Court.14 Rather, at this point, the Commission 
exercised discretion as to which cases it referred to the Court. Further, the 
 
 10.  CECILIA MEDINA QUIROGA & CLAUDIO NASH ROJAS, SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO DE 
DERECHOS HUMANOS: INTRODUCCIÓN A SUS MECANISMOS DE PROTECCIÓN 97 (2007).   
 11.  See generally CECILIA MEDINA, THE BATTLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: GROSS SYSTEMIC 
VIOLATIONS AND THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM (1988) (providing a history of the Inter-American 
Commission’s interventions in several countries); FELIPE GONZÁLEZ MORALES, SISTEMA 
INTERAMERICANO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS (2013) (providing history of the Commission). 
 12.  José Miguel Insulza, Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos: presente y futuro, 
ANUARIO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS 119, 122 (2006) (translating “fue la CIDH el único refugio real 
frente a las tiranías”). By comparison, the OAS was loath to condemn state atrocities, and even the UN 
Human Rights Commission, whose members sit in representation of states, took a weaker stance. 
Felipe González Morales, La Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos: antecedentes, funciones 
y otros aspectos, ANUARIO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS 35, 37 (2009). 
 13.  Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 UNTS 123. 
 14.  Since 2001, the Court’s docket has diversified, and yet, in 2012, twelve of its twenty-one cases 
concerned state violence, and since then, roughly half of IACtHR judgments have addressed acts of 
state violence. See generally Alexandra Huneeus, International Criminal Law by Other Means: The 
Quasi-Criminal Jurisdiction of the Human Rights Courts, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2013) (arguing that 
these international crimes have been a main focus of the IACtHR). 
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nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which play an important role in 
choosing what petitions to bring to the IAS, focused on questions of state 
atrocity and transitional justice.15 But the emphasis on state atrocity helped 
bolster the Court’s authority: it enabled the Court to borrow the Commission’s 
mantle of standing up to dictators, even if by the time it ruled, the dictators had 
stepped down. Further, the Court was able to rely on the support of a strong 
transnational network focused on accountability for state atrocities that pushed 
for compliance with its judgments. Finally, the focus on atrocity meant that the 
Court developed a significant jurisprudence on a single issue despite its limited 
capacity: the IACtHR has seven part-time judges, hold sessions roughly six 
times a year, and runs on a yearly budget of roughly five million dollars—
factors that make it the world’s least expensive IC.16 
By focusing its resources on developing one area of law that had the support 
of a transnational issue network and many successor governments, the Court 
was able to establish narrow expertise in this area of law and then slowly 
broaden its authority to other areas as its docket diversified. Today, although 
states might still flatly reject a judgment, this is rare.17 All state litigants subject 
to the Court’s jurisdiction have acknowledged that its judgments are legally 
binding. All state litigants participate in the Court’s proceedings, and most have 
taken “meaningful steps toward compliance”18 by paying monetary 
compensation pursuant to the Court’s orders.19 Overall, the Court has roughly 
achieved a 50 percent compliance rate with its orders for monetary 
compensation.20 The Court also orders equitable relief. Indeed, the IACtHR 
 
 15.  KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS PROSECUTIONS ARE 
CHANGING WORLD POLITICS 89–94 (2011) (arguing for the important role of transnational activist 
networks in fomenting accountability for state atrocity). The Center for Justice and International law 
(CEJIL), an NGO based in Washington, D.C., has played an important role in shaping the Court’s 
docket.  
 16.  Roberto Caldas, Judge, IACtHR, El Proceso de Supervisión de Decisiones: la Perspectiva de 
la Corte Interamericana, Panel: La Importancia del Proceso de Supervisión de Cumplimiento de las 
Decisiones del Sistema Interamericano at the Center for Justice and International Law Conference: La 
Implementación de Los Órganos del Sistema Interamericano y la Administración de Justicia: Sinergias, 
Tensiones y Posibilidades (Nov. 24, 2014). 
 17.  On October 23, 2014, the Dominican Republic’s president announced that the Dominican 
Republic “rejected” the IACtHR’s ruling in a case having to do with Haitian descendants born in the 
Dominican Republic. See El Gobierno Dominicano Rechaza la Sentencia de la Corte Interamericana de 
Derechos Humanos, PRESIDENCIA REPÚBLICA DOMINICANA (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.presidencia 
.gov.do/noticias/el-gobierno-dominicano-rechaza-la-sentencia-de-la-corte-interamericana-de-derechos-
humanos. On November 2, 2014, the Constitutional Court said that, due to a technical error, the 
Dominican Republic was not subject to the Court’s jurisdiction. See Tribunal Constitucional, 
noviembre 2, 2014, Sentencia TC/0256/14 (Dom. Rep.), http://www.tribunalconstitucional.gob.do/node 
/2762. 
 18.  Alter, Helfer & Madsen, supra note 7, at 10. 
 19.  Darren Hawkins & Wade Jacoby, Partial Compliance: A Comparison of the European and 
Inter-American Courts of Human Rights, 6 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 35, 37–38 (2010); Alexandra 
Huneeus, Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons from the Inter-American Court’s Struggle to Enforce Human 
Rights, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 493, 509 (2011). 
 20.  COURTNEY HILLEBRECHT, DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
TRIBUNALS: THE PROBLEM OF COMPLIANCE 51 (2014). 
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stands out among ICs for regularly ordering lengthy and ambitious to-do lists 
that include structural reform measures.21 As a result, full compliance is rare, 
but the Court has a fairly high “partial compliance” rate.22 
If the IACtHR’s only consistent achievement was judgment compliance, its 
authority would be limited to the resolution of about fifteen disputes per year, 
and its main compliance constituencies would be the region’s executive 
branches and the human rights NGOs that litigate internationally. But as will be 
argued below, the Court’s authority extends well beyond judgment compliance. 
In some states, domestic constitutional litigation has served as the platform on 
which the IACtHR’s authority has expanded to intermediate and broad 
authority, allowing it to cast a much longer shadow. 
A. The Rise of Neoconstitutionalism and the Inter-American Court 
In 1979, when the IACtHR first opened its doors, Latin American 
constitutional law would not have seemed an auspicious site from which to 
expand the Court’s authority. At that point, judges across Latin America were 
unwilling and, some argued, ill-equipped to practice judicial review. As one 
author wrote, despite the formal presence of judicial review in many Latin 
American constitutions, “it ha[d] not yet permeated the minds of the judges 
called to exercise it.”23 Predominant legal theories in states such as Chile 
emphasized the idea of the superiority of legislation—judges were meant to 
apply, rather than to question, laws passed by Congress.24 Often the Civil Code, 
rather than the Constitution, was considered the crown jewel of the national 
legal system. 
Beginning in 1988, the year of the IACtHR’s first contentious judgment, a 
new generation of constitutions emerged. Brazil (1988), Colombia (1991), 
Paraguay (1992), Ecuador (1998 and 2008), Peru (1993), Venezuela (1999), and 
Bolivia (2009) all introduced new constitutions, and Argentina, Mexico, and 
Costa Rica undertook important constitutional reforms.25 Although the new 
 
 21. Structural remedies, or guarantees of nonrepetition, are another way in which the Court 
overcomes its small docket. Alexandra Huneeus, Reforming the State from Afar: Structural Reform 
Litigation at the Human Rights Courts, 40 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2015).   
 22.  Hawkins and Jacoby find that states have complied with 50 percent of the IACtHR’s 
compliance orders, and that there is partial compliance with 83 percent of the Court’s case rulings. 
Hawkins & Jacoby, supra note 19, at 56.  
 23.  Rodolfo Piza Rocafort, Influencia de la Constitución de los Estados Unidos en las 
Constituciones de Europa y de América Latina, in LA CONSTITUCIÓN NORTEAMERICANA Y SU 
INFLUENCIA EN LATINOAMÉRICA: 200 AÑOS 1787–1987 53, 79 (Thomas Buergenthal, Jorge Mario 
García Laguardia & Rodolfo Piza Rocafort eds., 1987) (original quotation in Spanish reads “no ha 
calado aún en la mente de los jueces llamados a ejercer la función”). 
 24.  See Javier Couso, The Transformation of Constitutional Discourse and the Judicialization of 
Politics in Latin America, in CULTURES OF LEGALITY: JUDICIALIZATION AND POLITICAL ACTIVISM 
IN LATIN AMERICA 141, 149–52 (Javier A. Couso, Alexandra Huneeus & Rachel Sieder eds., 2010). 
 25.  Rodrigo Uprimny, Las transformaciones constitucionales recientes en América Latina: 
tendencias y desafíos, in EL DERECHO EN AMERICA LATINA: UN MAPA PARA EL PENSAMIENTO 
JURÍDICO DEL SIGLO XXI 109, 109 (César Rodríguez Garavito ed., 2011). Chile’s constitutional reform 
is not included here because it was not as far-reaching or rights-oriented. See discussion in part IV. 
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constitutions differ in important ways,26 they share important features when 
compared to the constitutions that preceded them. They manifest a greater 
commitment to the protection of rights, including socioeconomic and 
community rights, and “a vigorous opening to international human rights law, 
especially through special treatment and privileges accorded to treaties in this 
area.”27 Further, many of the constitutions established stronger judicial review 
mechanisms. Rights-based litigation soon became an important feature of 
political life in several states under the jurisdiction of the IACtHR.28 
These constitutional texts were partly shaped by new theories, originating in 
Europe, that view constitutions as not only delineating the competence of the 
branches of government, but as including substantive norms that commit the 
state to particular objectives and, correspondingly, a less formalistic approach 
to law.29 The Latin American variant of neoconstitutionalism has three main 
elements relevant to this inquiry.30 Each departs from prior constitutional 
theory or practice. The first element is judicial review of individual rights, 
meaning some or all national courts have authority to review legislation or 
executive action under the constitution. Latin American countries actually have 
a long history of judicial review: the nineteenth-century constitutions of both 
Colombia and Mexico formally established judicial review.31 But the practice 
was less frequent prior to the 1990s, and it was particularly rare for an 
individual to successfully challenge legislation as a violation of individual rights. 
Neoconstitutionalist thought makes strong-form review of individual rights a 
centerpiece of constitutional practice.32 Further, it shifts the emphasis of theory 
 
Note that it is not unusual for so many Latin American states to renew their constitutions. See Gabriel 
Negretto, Replacing and Amending Constitutions: The Logic of Constitutional Change in Latin America, 
46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 749 (2012).  
26.    For a discussion of the different kinds of constitutions that emerged in this era, see Roberto 
Gargarella, LATIN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM, 1810–2010: THE ENGINE ROOM OF THE 
CONSTITUTION, 148–95 (2013); Mauricio García Villegas, Constitucionalismo Aspiracional: Derecho, 
Democracia y Cambio Social en America Latina, 75 ANÁLISIS POLÍTICO 89 (2012); Uprimny, supra note 
25. 
 27.  Uprimny, supra note 25, at 114 (original quote in Spanish reads “una apertura al derecho 
internacional de los derechos humanos, en especial a través del tratamiento especial y privilegiado a los 
tratados de derechos humanos”).   
 28.  See generally THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA (Rachel Sieder, Line 
Schjolden & Alan Angell eds., 2009). 
 29.  Miguel Carbonell, El Neoconstitucionalismo en su Laberinto, in TEORIA DEL 
NEOCONSTITUCIONALISMO: ENSAYOS ESCOGIDOS 9–11 (Miguel Carbonell ed., 2007).   
30.    On the use of the term “neoconstitutionalism,” see supra note 5. 
 31.  Justice Manuel José Cepeda-Espinosa, Judicial Activism in a Violent Context: The Origin, 
Role, and Impact of the Colombian Constitutional Court, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 529, 538–
39 (2004) (showing that Colombia’s nineteenth-century constitution had judicial review); Vicente 
Fernández Fernández & Nitza Samaniego Behar, El juicio de amparo: historia y futuro de la protección 
constitucional en México [The Trial of Amparao: its History and the Future of this Constitutional 
Protection in Mexico], 27 REVISTA DEL INSTITUTO DE CIENCIAS JURIDICAS DE PUEBLA 173, 174 
(2011),ihttp://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?pid=S1870-21472011000100009&script=sci_arttext 
(showing that Mexico’s 1841 Constitution included the writ of amparo).  
 32.  Judicial review in the region has taken the form of what Mark Tushnet calls strong-form 
review, which, as in U.S. practice, “insists that the courts’ reasonable constitutional interpretations 
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and scholarship from the “organic” aspects of the constitution, which concern 
separation of powers and the attributes of different governing bodies, to the 
“dogmatic” aspects, in particular, fundamental rights.33 
A second element of Latin American neoconstitutionalism is the 
interpretive practice of viewing constitutions as embodying fundamental 
principles beyond (or implicit in) their written word. By the mid-twentieth 
century, formalist legal thought in Latin America was already under challenge 
by anti-formalist theories received and adapted from Europe. So strong had 
been formalism’s hold, however, that even HLA Hart’s Concept of Law was 
read as an anti-formalist text pointing the way toward a more open 
interpretative practice.34 Neoconstitutionalist thought pushes further away from 
formalism, emphasizing Dworkinian-style interpretation in which unwritten 
principles, including fundamental rights, are understood as belonging to the 
constitutional text. It represents support for judicial consideration of principles 
and values, proportionality and reasonability tests, and other constitutional 
doctrines that ultimately grant judges a large dose of discretion. 
The third relevant element of Latin American neoconstitutionalism, which 
flows from the second, is the doctrine of the “constitutional block.” Under this 
doctrine, judges interpreting the scope and meaning of constitutional rights 
must consider not only the text of the document, and not only the unwritten 
norms and commitments that underlie the constitution, but also human rights 
norms. Góngoro Mera defines the constitutional block as a set of norms and 
principles with constitutional rank that . . . “encompasses 1) the Constitution 
stricto sensu, 2) international declarations of human rights, such as the 
Universal Declaration and the American Declaration, and 3) human rights 
treaties ratified by the States.”35 Through this doctrine, human rights treaties are 
part of the constitution, rather than separate and external sources of law. 
Where neoconstitutionalism comes to shape judicial and legal practice, the 
IACtHR’s judgments take on a particularly salient role beyond dispute 
resolution. There are several reasons for this. Neoconstitutionalism emphasizes 
judicial review of rights and thus foments rights-based litigation. Further, as 
courts seek to determine the meaning of constitutional rights, they refer to 
international treaties—the American Convention in particular. It follows that 
 
prevail over the legislatures’ reasonable ones. . . . [T]heir interpretive judgments are final and 
unrevisable.” MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL 
WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 21 (2009).  
 33.  See Uprimny, supra note 25, at 100. A fourth important feature of neoconstitutionalism in 
Latin America—an emphasis on economic, social, and cultural rights as well as community, or group, 
rights and pluralism—will play less of a role in the discussion that follows.   
 34.  Diego López Medina, Teoría Impura del Derecho: La Transformación de la Cultural Jurídica 
Latinoamericana, 36 REVISTA CHILENA DE DERECHO 193, 193 (2009).   
 35.  MANUEL EDUARDO GÓNGORA MERA, INTER-AMERICAN JUDICIAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: 
ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL RANK OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES IN LATIN AMERICA THROUGH 
NATIONAL AND INTER-AMERICAN ADJUDICATION 162 (2011); see also id. at 161 (explaining the 
difference between the Constitutional Block doctrine in Europe, where it originated, and in Latin 
America). 
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the IACtHR’s jurisprudence interpreting the Convention and other rights 
treaties becomes an important source for domestic judicial review. For activists 
in neoconstitutionalist orders, the judgments of the IACtHR are not only a tool 
pushing for state compliance on the international plane following a judgment; 
they are also a tool for challenging laws and practices before the domestic 
judiciary. Litigants can invoke IACtHR judgments to shape how courts 
interpret law domestically without ever having to file a petition before the IAS. 
The Court’s jurisprudence becomes embedded domestically, and the Court’s 
authority can grow despite its small docket.36 
In some states, like Colombia and Argentina, neoconstitutionalist ideas 
have come to shape constitutional practice. In other states, they remain 
confined to the ivory tower. The following parts explore three case studies that 
seek to describe and explain these differences as a way to understand variation 
in the IACtHR’s authority. Colombia, Chile, and Venezuela span a broad 
spectrum of authority types: extensive, intermediate, and narrow.37 Each case 
study depicts the role neoconstitutionalist lawyers have played in contributing 
to key moments of constitutional reform (1991, 2005, and 1999, respectively), 
and in implementing a new constitutional practice. The discussion of each case 
study concludes by linking the role played by neoconstitutionalism in domestic 
politics to the type of authority the IACtHR has achieved. 
III 
THE RISE OF NEOCONSTITUTIONALISM IN COLOMBIA’S APEX COURTS 
Neoconstitutionalists played an important role in shaping Colombia’s 
constitutional reform of 1991 and thereafter in broadening the IACtHR’s 
authority. In 1988, in the midst of a political crisis, President Barco set in 
motion a process that would lead to a constituent assembly, and eventually, a 
dynamic new constitutional regime. Mauricio García Villegas writes that, unlike 
institutional changes undertaken in Venezuela and other states, the reform in 
Colombia was not motivated by revolutionary ideas but rather by a belief in the 
political utility of law.38 A key actor in this process was Manuel José Cépeda, a 
young attorney who, after receiving an LL.M. at Harvard, acted as advisor on 
the Constituent Assembly to both Presidents Barco and Gaviria. Cépeda first 
served as presidential advisor on the development of the constitution after its 
passage (1991–1993), and, later, as a Constitutional Court judge (2001–2009). 
Known for having embraced a neoconstitutionalist approach to law, he played 
an important role in drafting the proposals for a new constitution that 
ultimately framed the Constituent Assembly’s work.39 The 1991 Constitution 
 
 36.  See generally Laurence R. Helfer, Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: 
Embeddedness as a Deep Structural Principle of the European Human Rights Regime, 19 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 125 (2008).  
 37.  See supra Part I.  
 38.  Villegas, supra note 26, at 101. 
 39.  Unlike Brazil’s earlier Constituent Assembly, “Colombia’s Constituent Assembly began with a 
HUNEEUS_2-8 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/14/2016  2:24 PM 
188 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 79:179 
indeed bears neoconstitutionalist hallmarks: it defines human rights treaties as 
having supralegislative status, creates several types of judicial review, includes a 
broad list of rights encompassing socioeconomic and group rights, and provides 
that the “rights and duties enshrined in this Charter shall be interpreted in 
accordance with international human rights treaties ratified by Colombia.”40 
Perhaps the 1991 Constitution’s most important judicial innovation was the 
creation of a Constitutional Court (CCC), distinct from the Supreme Court, to 
which citizens had direct access through the writ of tutela.41 The CCC quickly 
became known for its bold, progressive, rights-based jurisprudence. Of the first 
generation of nine judges, three were progressive law professors who had 
studied abroad and who had links to the Universidad de los Andes, which 
boasted Colombia’s most internationalized law faculty.42 The judges, in turn, 
hired a strong group of academically inclined “auxiliary judges” (or professional 
clerks) trained in the United States and Europe who would contribute to the 
introduction and local construction of neoconstitutionalist doctrines and 
practices, including the constitutional block.43 
These judges and auxiliaries played a leading role in shaping the CCC’s 
work and, through the CCC, in expanding the IACtHR’s authority in 
Colombia. The 1991 Constitution provides only that international treaties 
ratified by Congress have “priority” domestically.44 During the Court’s first 
year, two rulings by these progressive scholar-judges would declare that human 
rights treaties are directly binding and superior to domestic legislation.45 In 1995 
the CCC first used the term “constitutional block” and began to systematize its 
meaning, declaring that human rights treaties had constitutional rank.46 Since 
then, Rodrigo Uprimny writes, it has “entered into national practice with much 
 
well[-]organized and detailed draft prepared by a bright young team of lawyers well versed in 
comparative constitutional law.” Keith S. Rosenn, A Comparison of the Protection of Individual Rights 
in the New Constitutions of Colombia and Brazil, 23 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 659, 661 (1992). 
Some of these young lawyers then went on to serve on the early CCC.  
 40.  CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 93.  
 41.  Id. art. 86. 
 42.  These three are: Ciro Angarita Barón (professor at Universidad de los Andes and Universidad 
Nacional), Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz (professor at Univiversidad de los Andes), and Alejandro 
Martínez Caballero (professor at the Universidad del Rosario). See MAGISTRADOS DE LA HISTORIA, 
http://www.eleccionvisible.com/index.php/magistrados-de-la-historia (last visited Feb. 27, 2015). 
 43.  These include Juan Jaramillo, Rodrigo Uprimny, Nestor Correa, Catalina Botero, Rodolfo 
Arango, Luis Fernando Restrepo, and Mauricio García Villegas. See Villegas, supra note 26, at 98 n. 28. 
 44.  C.P. supra note 40, art. 93. 
 45.  Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], octubre 28, 1992, Sentencia C-574/92, 
Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.); see Mónica Orango Olaya, El Bloque de 
Constitucionalidad an la Jurisprudencia de la Corte Constitucional Colombiana, PRECEDENTE 79, 81 
(2004). 
 46.  C.C., enero 19, 2000, Alejandro Martínez Caballero, Sentencia C-010/00, G.C.C. (Colom.) 
(“La Corte coincide con el interviniente en que en esta materia es particularmente relevante la doctrina 
elaborada por la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, que es el órgano judicial autorizado 
para interpretar autorizadamente la Convención Interamericana.”); see generally Hernán Alejandro 
Olano García, El Bloque de Constitucionalidad en Colombia, 3 ESTUDIOS CONSTITUCIONALES 231 
(2006) (describing the constitutional bloc in Colombia).  
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force.”47 Further, in 2000, in a ruling by one of the scholarly judges, the Court 
declared that the rulings of the IACtHR and, in some cases, the Commission, 
were self-executing.48 
A. Human Rights and Judicial Power during Colombia’s Civil War 
The story of the early CCC and its rapid construction of a 
neoconstitutionalist regime open to international human rights aligns well with 
Dezalay and Garth’s argument about groups of progressive lawyers who, in 
moments of opportunity, ally themselves with progressive political reformers 
and participate in the construction of a new legal regime.49 It is worth noting, 
however, the features of the Colombian political context that made it a uniquely 
auspicious place for neoconstitutionalism to take root. On one hand, Colombia 
is the Latin American state with the most egregious rights violations and the 
only state where an active conflict is still unfolding. On the other, Colombia has 
one of the highest levels of ratification of international human rights treaties 
and is a “net exporter of institutional innovations and constitutional 
jurisprudence.”50 This seeming paradox, writes Sandra Borda, is in part the 
product of a self-conscious strategy by the Colombian government to contain 
the damage to its reputation caused by reports of its widespread human rights 
abuses.51 During the Uribe Administration, the “almost compulsive ratification” 
of human rights treaties formed part of an executive strategy to project the 
image of a government that takes human rights seriously despite the presence 
of terrorists within the territory.52 It behooved the executive, and it was part of 
Colombia’s foreign policy, to demonstrate a strong adhesion to human rights. 
The political context was in this sense open to international human rights, which 
helps explain how the CCC was able to successfully construct IAS jurisprudence 
as a source of constraining authority. The CCC’s survival as a strong court may 
also be attributed to the support it gained through its early rights jurisprudence 
in a state where the other branches of government had low public approval and 
were in the midst of an ongoing internal conflict. NGOs and other actors in civil 
society turned to the CCC and supported it. 
Despite the CCC’s strong beginnings, its assertion of power and exercise of 
 
 47.  Rodrigo Uprimny, Bloque de Constitucionalidad en Colombia, Red de Escuelas Sindicales 1 
(2005), http://redescuelascsa.com/sitio/repo/DJS-Bloque_Constitucionalidad%28Uprimny%29.pdf. 
 48.  C.C., noviembre 2, 2000, M.P. Fabio Moron Diaz, Sentencia C-1490/00, G.C.C. (Colom.). 
 49.  See Garth & Dezalay, supra note 6, at 275. 
 50.  CÉSAR RODRÍGUEZ GARAVITO, LA GLOBALIZACIÓN DEL ESTADO DE DERECHO 40 (2009) 
(original quotation in Spanish reads: “En un giro paradójico de la historia social y jurídica, 
precisamente uno de los países con violaciones más graves de los derechos humanos ha pasado a ser 
exportader neto de jurisprudencia constituicional y de innovaciones institucionales . . . .”).  
 51.  Sandra Borda Guzmán, Politica exterior y derechos humanos en Colombia: un manual para la 
contencion de la presion internacional, in DERECHOS HUMANOS EN POLÍTICA EXTERIOR: SEIS CASOS 
LATINOAMERICANOS 123, 123 (Natalia Saltalamacchia Ziccardi & Ana Covarrubias Velasco eds., 
2011). 
 52.  Id. at 136 (original quotation in Spanish reads: “[L]a ratificación casi compulsive de tratados 
internacionales sobre esta material ha sido un component permanente y ha variado poco.”).  
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judicial review have fluctuated over time and remain subject to political 
constraints. Though President Gaviria participated in naming the first 
generation of judges who would play such an important role, all presidents since 
have tried to pass legislation to curtail the CCC’s power.53 The CCC is not 
immune to these threats, and some argue that it defers strategically.54 But even 
if the exact contours of the constitutional block and other rights doctrines 
fluctuate partly in response to politics, the CCC’s trajectory also speaks to the 
difficulty (although not impossibility) of containing a rights-based legal practice 
once it is out of the bottle, especially in a state where power is fragmented. 
B. The Intermediate and Extensive Authority of the IACtHR in Colombia 
The history described above suggests that the rise of a neoconstitutionalist 
order in Colombia has broadened and diversified the IACtHR’s authority. 
Today the Court exerts narrow, intermediate, and extensive authority in 
Colombia. 
When it deposited its instrument in 1985, Colombia became the eighth state 
to accept the Court’s jurisdiction. Since then, it has become one of the most 
frequently condemned states. The majority of the judgments against Colombia 
address state-sponsored violence or the failure to adequately investigate 
massacres.55 Colombia has never fully complied with an IACtHR judgment, and 
in particular it has failed to comply with orders to prosecute those who have 
committed atrocities. However, it actively participates in litigation, regularly 
complies with court orders to pay compensation and to provide symbolic 
reparations such as apologies, and has undertaken significant steps toward 
criminal investigation in all cases that have come before the IAS.56 
Further, the IACtHR’s authority in Colombia extends well beyond the 
resolution of particular disputes. In its abstract review of legislation, for 
example, the CCC consistently refers to the IACtHR’s jurisprudence as part of 
the constitutional block.57 In this way, much of the legal activity in Colombia 
that gives effect to the IAS never formally comes before the IAS; it is never the 
subject of a petition to the Commission or a case before the Court. Rather, the 
activity takes place in the shadow of the IAS through abstract and concrete 
judicial review before the CCC.58 An example is the CCC’s treatment of 
 
 53.  Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga, Strategic Deference in the Colombian Constitutional Court 1992–
2006, in COURTS IN LATIN AMERICA 81, 85 (Gretchen Helmke & Julio Ríos-Figueroa eds., 2011). 
 54.  Id.   
 55.  See, e.g., Mapirpan Massacre v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations & Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 134 (Sept. 15, 2005);  La Rochela Massacre v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations & Costs, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 163 (May 11, 2007); La Rochela Massacre v. Colombia, Merits, 
Reparations & Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 163 (May 11, 2007). 
 56.  For example, once a case that is before the national criminal justice system also comes before 
the IAS, Colombia’s Attorney General (Fiscalía General de la Nación) prioritizes it and hands it to 
prosecutors who specialize in such cases.  
 57.  See Uprimny, supra note 47; Hernán Alejandro Olano García, supra note 46. 
 58.  Note that it is likely that this domestic litigation shapes, in turn, the IAS jurisprudence. See 
Jorge Contesse, Inter-American Constitutionalism: The Interaction Between Human Rights and 
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indigenous rights. The IACtHR has never issued a judgment against Colombia 
on indigenous rights. It has in recent years, however, developed a rich 
jurisprudence in this area through cases against Nicaragua, Suriname, Paraguay, 
and Ecuador, and the CCC has frequently made reference to these cases and 
used them to review national legislation and treaties under the constitutional 
block.59 
The constitutionalization of the IAS has also meant that the CCC refers to 
IAS jurisprudence even in matters not traditionally considered to be human 
rights law, such as criminal, family, and administrative law.60 The Supreme 
Court and the Council of State, Colombia’s highest administrative court, also 
regularly refer to the IACtHR’s jurisprudence in interpreting questions of 
national law.61 
Perhaps the most striking example of the IACtHR’s extensive authority is 
its role in the current peace process. Like so many states negotiating peace in 
the midst of an internal armed conflict, Colombia must decide whether to 
facilitate negotiations through an amnesty or through some other formula that 
lifts or lightens penal responsibility for war crimes and other atrocities. But 
unlike any other state before it, Colombia’s peace comes at a time when the 
IACtHR and the Commission have developed a body of jurisprudence that 
restricts the options available; in particular, some argue it takes amnesty off the 
table entirely.62 The IAS’s jurisprudence thus occupies a central place in the 
discussions. In a surprising twist, it is the uribista Right—usually critical of 
IAS—that most often invokes Inter-American jurisprudence as a way to oppose 
the peace process, which they argue will be too lenient on the Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia.63 Meanwhile, there is a split in the traditional 
human rights and public-interest law community, with some NGOs supporting a 
harder line against amnesties, and others seeking ways to interpret the Inter-
 
Progressive Constitutional Law in Latin America, in LAW AND SOCIETY IN LATIN AMERICA: A NEW 
MAP 220 (César Rodríguez Garavito ed., 2015).   
 59.  See, e.g., C.C. julio 6, 2012, M.P. Humberto Sierra, Sentencia T-513/12 G.C.C. (Colom.) (citing 
to three Inter-American Court judgments focused on indigenous rights); C.C., noviembre 2, 2000, M.P. 
Fabio Moron Diaz, Sentencia C-1490/00, G.C.C. (Colom.). 
 60.  See Enrique Gil Botero, El principio de reparación integral en Colombia a la luz del Sistema 
Interamericano de Derechos, in PERSPECTIVA IBEROAMERICANA SOBRE LA JUSTICIA PENAL 
INTERNACIONAL 319 (Héctor Olásolo Alonso & Salvador Cuenca Curbello, eds., 2012); Rodrigo 
Uprimny, Bloque De Constitucionalidad, Derechos Humanos y Nuevo Procedimiento Penal 
(unpublished manuscript), https://www.wcl.american.edu/humright/hracademy/documents/Clase1-
Lectura3BloquedeConstitucionalidad.pdf. 
 61. Botero, supra note 60. 
 62.  See, e.g., Christina Binder, The Prohibition of Amnesties by the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1203 (2011); Lisa J. Laplante, Outlawing Amnesty: The Return of 
Criminal Justice in Transitional Justice Schemes, 49 VA. J. INT’L  L. 915 (2009). 
 63.  Thus, for example, Alvaro Uribe himself participated in a seminar organized by the Inter-
American Court, during which he emphasized that there is no peace without justice. See ¿Qué hay 
detrás del sorpresivo apoyo de Uribe a Santos?, EL TIEMPO POLITICA (Apr. 27, 2015), 
http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-de-paz/apoyo-de-uribe-a-santos-que-hay-detras/15637555. 
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American jurisprudence to facilitate rather than constrain the peace process.64 
All of these debates take place in the public arena but in the shadow of the law, 
for the IAS has never issued an amnesty ruling against Colombia. 
In sum, neoconstitutionalists in Colombia were able to seize a moment of 
political change to introduce and implement new ideas about judicial review, 
principled interpretation, and the constitutional block. Today the IACHtR’s 
judgments are frequently cited in domestic litigation over constitutional rights, 
and they continue to guide and constrain state actors while shaping public 
debates over certain policy matters. 
IV 
NEOCONSTITUTIONALISTS AND THE GRADUAL REFORM OF CHILE’S 
AUTHORITARIAN CONSTITUTION 
The Chilean Constitution was promulgated by the Pinochet dictatorship 
through a politically closed process in 1980. Unlike Venezuela and Colombia, 
then, Chile labors under a constitution that was written in an attempt to realize 
the political project of a prior and now illegitimate authoritarian regime. 
Further, the Chilean judiciary emerged from the dictatorship tainted by its 
deference to, and even collusion with, the Pinochet regime.65 During the decade 
after the return to democracy, the idea that such a judiciary should play a more 
active political role through constitutional review was received with reticence. 
One well-regarded liberal scholar of the time likened advocating for judicial 
review in Chile to handing one’s batterer a hammer.66 Even as judicial review of 
rights became an important political phenomenon in Argentina, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, and other democratic states in the region, Chile remained “the 
rights revolution that never was.”67 
In 2005, Chile’s center-left coalition led a reform process that sought to 
cleanse the 1980 constitution of its authoritarian features. Among many 
changes, the reform removed non-elected positions from the Senate and curbed 
presidential powers, including reducing the presidential term from six years to 
four years without direct reelection. One feature of this reform was to expand 
 
 64.  Thus, actors in support of the peace process frequently cite to a concurrence in the recent 
Mozote Massacre v. Salvador judgment of the Inter-American Court that seems to differentiate 
between amnesties after dictatorships and amnesties to end civil war. See, e.g., De la Calle ve fórmula 
para blindar la justicia transicional, EL TIEMPO POLITICA (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.eltiempo.com 
/politica/proceso-de-paz/proceso-de-paz-de-la-calle-ve-formula-para-blindar-la-justicia-
transicional/15297602. 
 65.  See Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (1991: vol. 1, 
CH.4, 117–26 (critiquing judiciary’s failure to defend rights under the Pinochet dictatorship); LISA 
HILBINK, JUDGES BEYOND POLITICS IN DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP: LESSONS FROM CHILE 1, 
180–83 (2007).   
 66.  Fernando Atria, Revisión Judicial: El Síndrome de la Víctima Insatisfecha, 79 ESTUDIOS 
PUBLICOS 348, 378 (2000). 
 67.  Javier A. Couso, The Judicialization of Chilean Politics: The Rights Revolution That Never 
Was, in THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA 105, 105 (Rachel Sieder, Line 
Schjolden & Alan Angell eds., 2009). 
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the powers of the Constitutional Court. It moved the practice of constitutional 
review of legislation from the Supreme Court, which is part of the regular 
judiciary, to the Constitutional Court. It also changed the procedures for 
nominating judges to the Constitutional Court (at last ending, for example, the 
role the Armed Forces played in the process).68 Some argued the 2005 reform 
was so extensive that its result was in effect a new constitution.69 However, the 
2005 reform left important Pinochet-era institutions in place, including electoral 
procedures that constrain majoritarian voting and, significantly, a priori abstract 
review of legislation. As argued in one author’s account, post-dictatorship 
constitutional politics in Chile have been characterized by a spirit of gradual 
reform, presidential leadership, and strong party discipline, with little voice 
given to civil society.70 The 2005 reform process “was conducted by a political 
elite accustomed to exercising power . . . who knew each other and created 
relatively closed spaces for dialogue. . . . The project was not much discussed by 
the press.”71 
The main legal scholars who advised the reform process were Francisco 
Zúniga and Humberto Noguiera, who were close to the ruling coalition (the 
Concertación), along with Gastón Gómez and Arturo Fermandois, chosen for 
their relation to the Right as well as the Center. Whereas Noguiera is a 
neoconstitutionalist who has advocated for the constitutional block in Chile and 
writes about the IAS regularly, the others are less enthusiastic about the role of 
international human rights in the domestic realm. Francisco Zúñiga, who played 
the most influential role in the process, deems neoconstitutionalism to be a type 
of “constitutional fetishism” and describes the IACtHR’s doctrine of 
conventionality review72 as a “paroxysm” of judicial discretion lacking in 
democratic grounding.73 Fermandois, a political conservative close to the Right, 
has argued that the IACtHR’s rulings are not binding within Chile.74 
Significantly, the reform did not alter or further specify the status of 
international human rights law domestically. 
The Constitutional Court’s docket grew as a result of the 2005 reform, and 
its judges, now more likely to be drawn from the political sphere, were less 
deferential than the Supreme Court judges before them in exerting judicial 
review of legislation, and less deferential than prior Constitutional Court judges 
 
 68.  FERNANDO ATRIA, LA CONSTITUCIÓN TRAMPOSA 16–17, 33 (2013).  
 69.  CLAUDIO FUENTES SAAVEDRA, EL PACTO: PODER, CONSTITUCIÓN Y PRÁCTICAS 
PÓLITICAS EN CHILE (1990–2010) 96 (2012). 
 70.  Id at 126. 
 71.  Id. at 126–27. 
 72.  Discussed further in Part V, infra. 
 73.  Francisco Züñiga Urbina, Nueva Constitucion y Constitucionalismo en Chile, 18 ANUARIO DE 
DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL LATINOAMERICANO 173, 175 (2012), http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/ 
publica /librev/rev/dconstla/cont/2012/pr/pr11.pdf. 
 74.  Expertos debaten sobre validez del recurso presentado en la Corte, EL MERCURIO (Oct. 17, 
2008),khttp://prensa.politicaspublicas.net/index.php/politicachile/2008/10/17/expertos-debaten-sobre-
validez-del-recur (reporting that Fermandois argued that the IACtHR’s rulings were politically 
binding, as opposed to legally binding). 
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in exerting abstract review. The Court began to participate in what scholars 
have called an “incipient activism.”75 But the new Constitutional Court elided 
neoconstitutionalist doctrines such as the constitutional block. One reason for 
this is legal: there was no explicit change in the status of human rights law in 
Chile. And while the 1980 Constitution can be read as consonant with the 
doctrine of the constitutional block, this was not part of the 2005 reform debate. 
Further, the judges who came into the Court were not neoconstitutionalist 
scholars. Rather, several had participated in the reform negotiations as 
members of the executive branch or the Senate.76 As in the negotiation process, 
these judges did not promote a theory about the role of international human 
rights in constitutional interpretation.  Indeed, many of them lacked basic 
knowledge about international human rights law.77 
Chile’s legal community, however, has not been immune to the 
neoconstitutionalist ferment in the region. As in other states, the role of 
constitutional law has begun to generate more interest, and the status of those 
who study constitutional law has risen.78 Today there are constitutional and 
human rights scholars who emphasize rights review and constitutional law as 
well as international law in all of the main Chilean law schools. Chilean scholars 
study abroad, constitute part of transnational networks of constitutional law, 
and participate in conferences in which neoconstitutionalism is studied and 
discussed. Increasingly, law school clinics and several NGOs engage in strategic 
rights litigation before the national and international judiciary.79 But 
neoconstitutionalism has had less impact in the Chilean political order than in 
Colombia, and it has received a less enthusiastic reception among the scholars 
who have the social and professional ties that allow them to participate in 
constitutional reform. 
Chile may soon undergo another constitutional moment. Throughout her 
campaign and upon taking office in March 2014, President Bachelet announced 
that a new constitution, be it through Congress or a constituent assembly, would 
be one of the three pillars of her second term.80 These reforms were put on the 
 
 75.  Indeed, during the 2013 campaign, presidential candidates regularly called for laws to curb its 
powers. Judith Schonsteiner & Javier A. Couso, The Uses of International Human Rights Law in Chile's 
Constitutional Court: Errors and Politicization, paper presented at Law and Society Annual Conference 
1, 4 (2014) (on file with author). 
 76.  These judges are Mario Fernández, Jose Antonio Viera Gallo, Jorge Correa Sutil, Carlos 
Carmona, and Gonzalo García.  See Claudio Fuentes, supra note 69, at 256–57. 
 77.  Schonsteiner & Couso, supra note 75, at 20. 
 78.  See Couso, supra note 24, at 146–48. 
 79.  The Universidad Diego Portales Law School has created the Clínica de AIP y Derechos 
Humanos, CENTRO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS, http://www.derechoshumanos.udp.cl/derechoshumanos/ 
index.php/clinicas/clinica-aip-y-derechos-humanos (last visited Sept. 17, 2015). The Universidad de 
Chile also has a public interest clinic. FACULDAD DE DERECHO: UNIVERSIDAD DE CHILE, 
http://www.derecho.uchile.cl/pregrado/secretaria-de-estudios/53639/ensenanza-clinicas-juridicas-clinica-
de-interes-publico (last visited Sept. 17, 2015). 
 80.  Bachelet: “Chile necesita una carta magna nacida en democracia,” RT (Dec. 16, 2013), 
http://actualidad.rt.com/actualidad/view/114366-bachelet-presidenta-chile-reforma-constitucion 
(reporting on Bachelet’s first public address during her second term, in which she reiterated her 
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political agenda by massive student protests portraying Chile’s neoliberal 
economic system and the 1980 Constitution as an illegitimate “iron jacket” 
imposed by a dictator.81 It is possible that one day, as in Colombia and 
Argentina, a new constitution could open the door to expansion of the 
IACtHR’s authority beyond judgment compliance—the “narrow” level. Indeed, 
Bachelet’s official proposals for a new constitution emphasize that it would give 
“maximum value” to human rights treaties.82 Some of Bachelet’s advisors, 
however, are not devotees of neoconstitutionalism; rather, they view individual-
rights litigation as linked to the neoliberal project she is trying to overcome.83 
Thus, Bachelet’s constitutional-reform agenda includes eliminating the 
Constitutional Court’s power to exert abstract review over legislation, which in 
Colombia has been an important platform for expanding the IACtHR’s 
influence, but in Chile is viewed as one of the anti-majoritarian features of the 
1980 constitution that crimps democratic politics.84 
A. The Narrow and Intermediate Authority of the IACtHR in Chile 
Since accepting the IACtHR’s jurisdiction in 1990, Chile has been the 
subject of seven judgments. In each, the state has participated actively in the 
litigation before the Commission and the Court. Further, with each ruling, the 
Chilean state has taken meaningful steps toward compliance: it has complied 
with at least some of the Court’s orders in all its cases, and in two cases, it has 
reached full compliance, making it the state with the highest compliance rate.85 
Indeed, to comply with the first human rights judgment entered against it, Chile 
went so far as to amend its constitution,86 which an Open Society report refers 
to “as the ultimate example of compliance.”87 Chile has even taken significant 
steps toward compliance in responding to the Court’s orders to investigate and 
punish for matters of state atrocity, the types of orders that have the lowest 
compliance rate in the Inter-American System.88 Taken together, these actions 
 
commitment to reforming the Constitution).  
 81.  See, e.g., The Dam Breaks, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 27, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/ 
21526906. 
 82.  Nueva Constitución, BACHELET CAMPAIGN, http://michellebachelet.cl/wp-content/uploads/ 
2013/10/Nueva-Constituci%C3%B3n-28-35.pdf (“[T]he fundamental charter should give the greatest 
value to the principles and international treaties that recognize the rights of the human person. It is the 
duty of the organs of the state to respect, promote, and assure, at every level of protection, the exercise 
of human rights.”) (author’s translation).  
 83.  See FERNANDO ATRIA ET AL., El OTRO MODELO: DEL ORDEN NEOLIBERAL AL RÉGIMEN 
DE LO PÚBLICO 186–89 (2013).  
 84.  Nueva Constitución, supra note 82, at 34. 
 85.  See “The Last Temptation of Christ” (Olmedo-Bustos et al.) v. Chile, Monitoring Compliance 
with Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 73 (Feb. 5, 2001) (declaring full compliance to Last 
Temptation in 2003, after amending law creating prior censorship, and full compliance to Claude Reyes 
in 2008). 
 86.  See id. 
 87.  OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS, FROM JUDGMENT TO JUSTICE: IMPLEMENTING 
INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS DECISIONS 74 (2010). 
 88.  Bárbara Ivanschitz Boudeguer, Un Estudio Sobre el Cumplimiento y la Ejecución de las 
HUNEEUS_2-8 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/14/2016  2:24 PM 
196 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 79:179 
suggest that Chile has reached the greatest “narrow authority” in the region. 
Chile also shows an emerging “intermediate authority.” Following the Atala 
v. Chile judgment89 in which Chile was found to have violated the American 
Convention for stripping a lesbian of custody over her biological children, the 
Congress passed anti-discrimination legislation even though the IACtHR had 
not ordered it to do so.90 The judgment thus arguably had effects beyond 
judgment compliance. Further, a study of the Constitutional Court of Chile, the 
seat of higher-law review, shows that its judges have begun to cite to IACtHR 
judgments, but concludes that it “employs the Inter-American Court of Human 
Right’s jurisprudence in only a timid fashion.”91 The constitutional tribunal cites 
mostly to cases against Chile, and it seems not to acknowledge the difference in 
the legal authority in Chile between the European Court of Human Rights and 
the IACtHR. A study by Couso and Schonsteiner finds that the tribunal shows 
“a disregard for international standards” and undertakes only “occasional 
references depending on topical conveniences.”92 They also find that 
congressional debates suggest congresspersons are poorly advised on 
international law, and that they “seem to be unfamiliar with rudimentary 
elements of the interpretation of international human rights law and public law, 
as the submissions to the tribunal tend to show.”93 
The IACtHR’s influence in Chile does have some features of extensive 
authority. Some actors not directly charged with state compliance recognize the 
IACtHR as authoritative. For example, there are a few NGOs and law school 
clinics that have experience in litigation before the IAS, some international 
human rights legal scholars who write about the Court, and several 
constitutional law scholars who engage in scholarly debates about the IAS. But 
these actors form a relatively small group, and the Court’s jurisprudence does 
not “consistently shape law and politics” for any particular issue.94 
Neoconstitutionalists have been kept mostly on the sidelines in moments of 
constitutional reform. They have not succeeded in shaping the practice of the 
apex courts. And there is a strong division between constitutional law and 
 
Sentencias de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos por el Estado de Chile, 11 ESTUDIOS 
CONSTITUCIONALES 275, 303–07 (2013).   
 89.  Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Merits, Relief, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 502 (Feb. 24, 2012). 
 90.  Boudeguer, supra note 88, at 322–24. 
 91.  Humberto Nogueira Alcalá, Diálogo Interjurisdiccional, Control De Convencionalidad y 
Jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional en Período 2006–2011, 10 ESTUDIOS 
CONSTITUCIONALES 57, 128 (2012) (original quotation in Spanish reads “El Tribunal Constitucional en 
el periodo 2006–2011, emplea en forma tímida la jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de 
Derechos Humanos.”). 
 92.  Schonsteiner & Couso supra note 75, at 12. 
 93.  Id. 
 94. Alter, Helfer & Madsen, supra note 7, at 10. It could be argued that in the area of amnesty law, 
the Court has extensive authority across the region, including in Chile. In any debate over amnesty 
laws, including the debate to repeal the 1978 amnesty law in Chile, the Court’s jurisprudence on this 
matter will be frequently invoked. However, this is muddied by the fact that there is a specific order 
against Chile to repeal the law, so it is also a judgment-compliance matter. 
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international human rights law, meaning that the IACtHR’s judgments are little 
used in domestic litigation. As a result, while the IACtHR enjoys narrow 
authority and a high level of judgment compliance in Chile, it has not come to 
shape policy in any specific matter beyond the country’s judgment compliance. 
V 
NEOCONSTITUTIONALISTS AND VENEZUELA’S BOLIVARIAN REVOLUTION 
Neoconstitutionalism was sidelined by Hugo Chávez’s Bolivarian 
Revolution.95 Chávez rose to the presidency in 1998, marking the end of 
Venezuela’s “pacted democracy,” an arrangement in which a small elite held 
power, and leadership of the government alternated between the two main 
political parties that had dominated politics since 1958.96 Backed by a large 
majority, President Chávez called for a constituent assembly to create a new 
constitution, and vowed to end the corruption, cronyism, and concentration of 
power that had characterized Venezuelan politics.97 
Though Chávez’s ascent threatened the status quo, his administration at first 
seemed open to international human rights and to the IAS in particular. Chávez 
vowed to investigate the human rights violations that had occurred prior to his 
presidency, some of which were under the review of the Inter-American 
System.98 Further, the text that emerged from the Constituent Assembly 
contains one of the most human rights-friendly clauses in the region. Article 23 
of the Venezuelan Constitution declares that international human rights treaties 
enter into the national system at the constitutional level, and adds that under 
the pro homini principle, the Constitution yields to the international human 
right if the latter is more protective.99 The 1999 Constituent Assembly also 
relied on the American Convention to define certain rights, and the 
constitutional text directly refers to the Convention in a clause on regimes of 
emergency.100 
These human rights clauses were proposed to the Human Rights Committee 
of the Constituent Assembly by Allan Brewer Carías, a proponent of 
neoconstitutionalist thought, and one of only four members of opposition 
parties elected to the Constituent Assembly.101 He wrote the proposed text for 
Article 23 with the help of two of his law firm associates, Pedro Nikken, a 
former president of the IACtHR, and Carlos Ayala, a former president of the 
 
 95.  Bolivarian in this context refers to Simón Bolívar, one of the leaders of the struggle for 
independence from Spain, and not the country Bolivia (which is itself named after Simón Bolívar). 
 96.  Jennifer McCoy, Chavez and the End of “Partyarchy” in Venezuela, 10 J. OF DEMOCRACY 64, 
64 (1999). 
 97.  Id. at 73. 
 98.  Manuel A. Gomez, Political Activism and the Practice of Law in Venezuela, in CULTURES OF 
LEGALITY 182, supra note 24, at 192–93. 
 99.  CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA [C.V.] art. 23. 
 100.  Id. art. 339. 
 101.  See generally ALLAN BREWER CARÍAS, ASAMBLEA CONSTITUYENTE Y PROCESO 
CONSTITUYENTE 1999 ch. VII (2013) (exploring constituent assembly and process). 
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Inter-American Commission.102 Although Brewer Carías was a member of the 
opposition, the Committee accepted these proposals practically without 
change.103 
Although these neoconstitutionalists were able to influence certain clauses 
of the 1998 constitutional text, they did not participate in putting the new 
constitutional regime into effect. Chávez rose to power specifically as an 
outsider and proceeded to exclude the traditional ruling elites from his 
administration. As he began to interfere with the independence of the 
judiciary,104 many of the lawyers and scholars who would have usually ended up 
as presidential advisors instead joined the opposition. Further, they were 
excluded from the Supreme Court and did not participate in the construction of 
the Bolivarian constitution. As two observers note, Bolivarian constitutionalism 
is “a phenomenon that emerged outside the academy, produced more by the 
demands of social movements than by constitutional law professors.”105 
Neoconstitutionalism instead became the foil against which theorists of the 
Venezuelan constitution would understand their own practice. Two Spanish law 
professors who acted as consultants to the constituent assemblies of Venezuela, 
Ecuador, and Bolivia argue that these three constitutions taken together reflect 
a “new Latin American constitutionalism,” which they define in opposition to 
neoconstitutionalism.106 Like neoconstitutionalism, this new constitutionalism is 
less formalist in jurisprudential orientation and is committed to social and 
economic rights. However, the two strands diverge on important points. 
Whereas neoconstitutionalism emphasizes judicial power and fundamental 
rights as checks on state power, the new constitutionalism emphasizes the 
national constituent assembly and the sovereign will of the people as sources of 
the constitution’s legitimacy.107 As in some U.S. interpretive schools, the 
constitution must be understood primarily through the lens of the founding 
moment as an expression of national sovereignty.108 
 
 102.  Id. 
 103. See generally id.  
 104.  Chávez put in place a provisional system that destabilized judicial tenure, making the judiciary 
dependent on the executive. See Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. 
Venezuela, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 182 
¶ 253 (Aug. 5, 2008). 
 105.  Roberto Viciano Pastor & Ruben Martinez Dalmau, ¿Se puede hablar del nuevo 
constitucionalismo latinoamericano como una corriente doctrinal sistematizada? 3–4 (2010) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/wccl/ponencias/13/245.pdf (original quotation 
in Spanish reads “un fenómeno surgido en el extrarradio de la Academia, product más de las 
reinvidicaciones de los movimientos sociales que de los profesores de Derecho Constitucional.”). 
 106.  Pedro Salazar Ugarte, El Nuevo Constitucionalismo Latinoamericano (Una Perspectiva 
Crítica), in EL CONSTITUCIONALISMO CONTEMPORANEO 345, 351 (Luis Raul Gonzalez Perez & Diego 
Valades eds., 2013), http://biblio.juridicas.unam.mx/libros/7/3271/22.pdf; see also BOAVENTURA DE 
SOUSA SANTOS, REFUNDACIÓN DEL ESTADO EN AMÉRICA LATINA: PERSPECTIVAS DESDE UNA 
EPISTEMOLOGIA DEL SUR (2010). 
 107.  Eduardo Meier García, Nacionalismo Constitucional y Derecho Internacional de los Derechos 
Humanos, 9 ESTUDIOS CONSTITUCIONALES 329, 330 (2011). 
 108.  Salazar, supra note 106, at 352–53; Javier Couso, Radical Democracy and the New Latin 
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Accordingly, the practice of the Venezuelan judiciary has moved from 
formalism to a more purposive view of judicial interpretation.109 The rulings of 
the Venezuelan Supreme Court openly portray judges as participants in the 
Bolivarian Revolution and as having its social and political program as an 
explicit end.110 Indeed, judges who have ruled against the Chávez 
Administration or that of his successor, Maduro, risk losing their jobs,111 while 
the President of the Supreme Court feels comfortable airing in public his pro-
Chavéz political views.112 The Supreme Court thus has little use for 
neoconstitutionalist theories about fundamental rights or for the judgments of 
the IACtHR, a foreign, nondemocratic body that, like the American 
Convention, prioritizes civil and political rights over development of social and 
economic rights. 
But, as will be shown below, neoconstitutionalism still had a role to play: it 
became the preferred legal theory of at least some anti-Chavista activists. 
A. The Shrinking Authority of the IACtHR under Hugo Chávez 
Venezuela was an early participant in the IACtHR. In 1981 it became the 
second state to accept jurisdiction and has since been a respondent in seventeen 
cases. Prior to Chávez’s ascent in 1998, however, the Inter-American Court had 
issued only one contentious judgment against Venezuela. Thus, the IACtHR 
was not known beyond a small group of human rights lawyers and the executive 
actors charged with international litigation. 
Starting in 1999, as Chávez increasingly gained control over government 
institutions, his opponents saw in the IAS a forum for opposing him, especially 
on matters of freedom of expression and judicial independence. Manuel Gómez 
writes that a group of elite corporate lawyers metamorphosed into cause 
lawyers, taking on cases of well-heeled Chávez opponents who were being 
prosecuted and, they argued, persecuted.113 When they found doors closed 
domestically by a judiciary that had adopted Bolivarian values, they often 
turned to the IAS, to which some had close ties. One of the most emblematic 
 
American Constitutionalism 9–11 (unpublished manuscript), http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/ 
sela/SELA13_Couso_CV_Eng_20130516.pdf.  
 109.  See Raúl Sánchez Uribarri, Courts between Democracy and Hybrid Authoritarianism: Evidence 
from the Venezuelan Supreme Court, 63 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 856, 873–78 (2011); Rogelio Pérez 
Perdomo, Judicialization and Regime Transformation: The Venezuelan Supreme Court, in THE 
JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA 131, supra note 67, at 141.  
 110.  Alexandra Huneeus, Rejecting the Inter-American Court in CULTURES OF LEGALITY, supra 
note 24, at 128 (quoting the Supreme Court as holding that “law is a normative theory at the service of 
the politics underlying the axiological project of the Constitution”). 
 111.  See Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela, Preliminary 
Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 182 (Aug. 5, 2008) (finding 
three administrative law judges were dismissed for political reasons). 
 112.  Omar Mora Díaz, presidente del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia “Sí, yo sí soy revolucionario,” 
EL NACIONAL (Feb. 5, 2005), http://www.sumate.org/democracia-retroceso/T1ST02P8V1% 
20Y%20V2.HTM. 
 113.  Manuel A. Gomez, in CULTURES OF LEGALITY, supra note 24, at 183. 
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cases in this sense involves the neoconstitutionalist scholar Allan Brewer 
Carías. Following a 2002 attempted coup against Chávez, the government 
opened a criminal case against Carías for his alleged participation in the 
conspiracy to topple the government. Claiming innocence and fearing unfair 
judicial treatment, Carías fled the country and filed a petition with the IAS. The 
Commission accepted the case and eventually referred it to the Court even 
though, Venezuela argued, Carías had not exhausted domestic remedies.114 A 
similar case was that of Leopoldo López, a political opponent of the Chávez 
government, charged with corruption and disqualified from serving in political 
office in 2004.  López petitioned the Inter-American System, claiming irregular 
process and violation of political rights;  the Inter-American Court ruled in his 
favor in 2011.115 He immediately launched a presidential bid.116 
The Court, then, had as interlocutor a small, elite compliance constituency 
that filed cases with the IAS, a feature of emerging intermediate authority. In 
the end, however, their litigation strategy did not broaden the Court’s authority; 
it did just the opposite. The Venezuelan judiciary increasingly rejected the 
recommendations and rulings of the Inter-American Commission and Court. 
Starting in 2000, the new Supreme Court issued a series of rulings that 
challenged the authority of the Commission, arguing that its precautionary 
measures were not binding, and ignoring or rejecting IAS jurisprudence on 
freedom of expression.117 The Supreme Court also resisted IAS efforts to 
protect judicial independence in Venezuela. In Apitz v. Venezuela, the IACtHR 
found that the government had violated the American Convention by 
interfering with judicial independence and ordered Venezuela to reinstate three 
judges who had been dismissed after rulings against the government.118 The 
Venezuelan Supreme Court responded by ruling that the Apitz judgment was 
inconsistent with the Venezuelan Constitution and could not be implemented.119 
It also stated that the IACtHR had overstepped its mandate, and called on the 
Venezuelan government to denounce the American Convention—four years 
 
 114.  The acceptance of Brewer Carías’ and Leopaldo López’s case features prominently in 
Venezuela’s letter of denunciation as revealing an anti-Venezuela bias. Before the Chávez 
Administration, the Court allowed only litigants in non-democratic governments to forego the 
exhaustion of domestic remedies requirement. See Denunciation letter from the Minister of Popular 
Power for Foreign Affairs of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, to the Gen. Secretariat of the Org. 
of Am. States (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.oas.org/DIL/Nota_Rep%C3%BAblica_Bolivariana 
_Venezuela_to_SG.English.pdf. 
 115.  López Mendoza v. Venezuela, Merits, Relief, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
C) No. 233 (Sept. 24, 2011).  
 116.  Leopoldo Lopez Launches Venezuela Presidential Bid, BBC NEWS, Sept. 25, 2011, http://www 
.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-15050728. 
 117.  Meier, supra note 107, at 332–60. 
 118.  See Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela, Preliminary 
Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 182 (Aug. 5, 2008). 
 119.  Tribunal Supremo de Justicia [T.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Caso Gustavo Alvarez Arias y otros, 
December 18, 2008, M.P. Magistrado Ponente: Arcadio Delgado Rosales, Sentencia 1939/2008 (Venez.) 
(http://www.tsj.gov.ve/decisiones/scon/diciembre/1939-181208-2008-08-1572.html).   
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before the government actually did so.120 The Supreme Court similarly ruled 
that the Inter-American Court’s judgment in Leopoldo López v. Venezuela 
could not be executed.121 
Even as the Supreme Court challenged the IAS domestically through its 
rulings, the executive increasingly challenged the IAS on the international 
stage, depicting it as controlled by U.S. interests and calling for reform at the 
OAS.122 Further, although the foreign ministry continued to defend Venezuela 
before the Court, its participation became ever more reluctant: it stopped 
reporting to the Court on the implementation of judgments, making it 
impossible for the Court to properly monitor compliance, and it even failed to 
pay compensatory damages in an emblematic case.123 Chávez finally denounced 
the American Convention in 2012 with a long, carefully argued letter accusing 
the IAS of overstepping its mandate, of bias against Venezuela, and of catering 
to U.S. interests.124 The denunciation took effect in September 2013. According 
to the IACtHR, Venezuela will still be bound to participate in proceedings and 
be bound by the judgments in cases filed before that date.125 Venezuela 
continues to appear before the Court, and even succeeded in getting the Court 
to dismiss the Brewer Carías case in 2014 on the ground that the applicant had 
not exhausted local resources.126 But a 2015 judgment against Venezuela was 
repudiated by the Venezuelan Supreme Court, which held that the Inter-
American Court had violated the American Convention, and urged the 
Venezuelan government to denounce the Inter-American Court before the 
OAS General Assembly.127 It is arguable that the Court’s authority has withered 
from “narrow” to none. 
The Bolivarian Revolution, then, was a political project that stood in tension 
with constitutional theories that emphasized judicial review as well as 
fundamental and transnational rights. Neoconstitutionalism became the foil 
against which Bolivarian constitutionalism would be defined. Further, Chávez’s 
opponents—some of them neoconstitutionalist scholars and practitioners— 
 
 
 120.   Id. at “Decisión,” no. 2. 
 121.  Tribunal Supremo de Justicia [T.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Oct. 17, 2011, M.P. Magistrado 
Ponente: Arcadio Delgado Rosales, Sentencia 1547/2011 (Venez.) (http://www.tsj.gov.ve/decisiones/ 
scon/octubre/1547-171011-2011-11-1130.html). 
 122.  Human Rights Watch, Concentración y Abuso de Poder en la Venezuela de Chávez, 46–51 
(2012) (http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/venezuela0812sp.pdf). 
 123.  Blanco Romero et al v. Venezuela, Inter-Am.Ct.H.R., Monitoring Compliance with Judgment. 
Order of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of November 22, 2011 at para. 32–35. 
 124.  Letter from Nicolás Maduro, Venezuelan Foreign Minister, to José Miguel Insulza, OAS 
Secretary General (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.scribd.com/doc/105813775/Carta-de-denuncia-a-la-
Convencion-Americana-sobre-Derechos-Humanos-por-parte-de-Venezuela-ante-la-OEA. 
 125.  Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.Ct.H.R. (ser. C) No. 74 
(Feb. 6, 2001) at para. 49. 
 126.  Case of Brewer Carías v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objections, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C). No. 278 (May 26, 2014) at 46.  
127.    Tribunal Supremo de Justicia [T.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sept. 10, 2015, Caso Reynaldo Munoz 
Pedroza y otros, Sentencia 1175/2015 (Venez.). 
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turned to the IAS to defend themselves and to challenge the government’s 
policies, pitting Chávez against the IAS. In the end, however, this contest 
diminished the IACtHR’s authority in Venezuela. 
VI 
NEOCONSTITUTIONALISM AS A TRANSNATIONAL NETWORK: COLONIZING 
THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT 
Thus far the discussion of neoconstitutionalism has focused on national legal 
practices and political processes. But part of the power of epistemic 
communities is that their members can work across national borders and play a 
role in shaping international as well as domestic institutions.128 Such changes in 
the international sphere can then boomerang back to influence the domestic 
sphere.129 This part shows that neoconstitutionalists have increasingly taken 
leadership roles on the IACtHR as judges and clerks, and that 
neoconstitutionalist ideas and practices have permeated the Court. The 
jurisprudence of the Court now reflects a neoconstitutionalist understanding of 
domestic constitutional law, and may, in turn, further push domestic legal 
systems in this direction. 
An example of this transnational dynamic can be found by focusing on an 
important node in the Latin American neoconstitutionalist network, 
Universidad Nacional de México (UNAM), which is home to two research 
centers, the Instituto Iberoamericano de Derecho Constitucional (IIDC), part of 
a transnational effort to promote liberal constitutionalism, and the Instituto de 
Investigaciones Jurídicas (IIJ), a well-regarded center for the study of law. 
Although IIDC and IIJ scholars adhere to more than one view of 
constitutionalism, neoconstitutionalism has been prominent.130 The IIDC has 
also been important to the IAS.131 The director of the IIDC from 1972 through 
2002 was Hector Fix-Zamudio. During his tenure as director, Fix-Zamudio also 
served two terms as a judge on the IACtHR, from 1986 through 1997, and was 
twice its president (1993, 1994–1997). The year after he stepped down, another 
investigator from the Institute, Sergio García Ramírez, became a two-term 
judge and served as President of the IACtHR (1998–2009, and President from 
 
 128.  The concept of epistemic communities refers to “professional networks with authoritative and 
policy-relevant experience.” Mai’a K. Davis Cross, Rethinking Epistemic Communities Twenty Years 
Later, 39 REV.  INT’L STUD. 137, 137 (2012).  
 129.  MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS 12 (1998) 
(explaining the boomerang effect, whereby domestic actors use international institutions and allies to 
create domestic change). 
 130.  Armin von Bogdandy, Ius constitutionale commune latinoamericanum. Una aclaración 
conceptual, in IUS CONSTITUTIONALE COMMUNE EN AMERICA LATINA: RASGOS, POTENCIALIDADES 
Y DESAFIOS 3, 4 n.3 (Armin von Bogdandy, Hector Fix-Fierro & Mariela Morales Antoniazzi eds., 
2014). 
 131.  Hector Fix-Fierro, Los juristas academicos del Instituto de Investigaciones Juridicas de la 
UNAM y la construccion juridical de las nuevas instituciones democraticas, in LOS ABOGADOS Y LA 
FORMACIÓN DEL ESTADO MEXICANO 451, 456–57 (Oscar Cruz Barney, Hector Fix-Fierro & Elisa 
Speckman Guerra eds., 2013).   
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2004–2007).132 In 2012, Eduardo Ferrer-Macgregor, yet another investigator of 
the UNAM institute who has written extensively on the doctrine of 
conventionality review, started his first six-year term.133 Further, the IIJ has an 
ongoing project with the Max Planck Institute of Germany to foment a ius 
commune constitucional Americano—a transnational doctrine of fundamental 
rights shared across the Latin American states that has been constructed in 
great part by judicial dialogue that involves and, in some versions, prioritizes 
the IACtHR. Among participants in the UNAM–Max Planck ius 
constitucionale network are several former judges, former presidents, the 
Secretary of the IACtHR, and members of the Inter-American Commission.134 
Through these and other links, the influence of neoconstitutionalist thought 
on the IACtHR has been decisive. During his tenure as Court President, IIDC 
investigator Sergio García Ramirez penned what is arguably the most 
significant ruling in the Court’s neoconstitutionalist turn. In Almonacid v. Chile 
the Court announced its interpretation of the American Convention as 
demanding that all judges in states under its jurisdiction have the duty to review 
legislation under the American Convention and “must refrain from enforcing 
any laws contrary to such Convention”: 
[W]hen a State has ratified an international treaty such as the American Convention, 
its judges, as part of the State, are also bound by such Convention. . . . In other words, 
the Judiciary must exercise a sort of “conventionality control” between the domestic 
legal provisions which are applied to specific cases and the American Convention on 
Human Rights. To perform this task, the Judiciary has to take into account not only 
the treaty, but also the interpretation thereof made by the Inter-American Court, 
which is the ultimate interpreter of the American Convention.135 
This judge-made doctrine is a bold amalgam of Marbury v. Madison and 
Van Gend en Loos.136 It seems to say that all the judges in states that have 
ratified the American Convention must exert conventionality review—even 
those judges in places, such as Colombia, where constitutional review is not 
diffuse, and Chile, where it is contested whether or not the Convention has 
direct effect. Since this judgment, the Court has softened and added nuance to 
 
 132.  For a list of prior presidents of the Inter-American Court, see I/A Court Composition, CORTE 
INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index.php/en/about-
us/composicion (last visited July 17, 2015). 
 133.  Miguel Carbonell, an IIDC investigator who wrote one of the founding works on 
neoconstitutionalism, has served as an ad hoc judge, and José de Jesús Orozco and Carlos Ayala, two 
other IIDC members, have served as presidents of the Commission. Participation in IIDC is by 
nomination. For IIDC governance, see Estatuto, INSTITUTO IBEROAMERICANO DE DERECHO 
CONSTITUCIONAL, http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/iidc/estatuto.htm (last visited July 17, 2015); for 
membership, see INSTITUTO IBEROAMERICANO DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL, http://www.juridicas 
.unam.mx/iidc/ (last visited July 17, 2015). 
 134.  IUS CONSTITUTIONALE COMMUNE EN AMERICA LATINA: RASGOS, POTENCIALIDADES Y 
DESAFIOS (Armin von Bogdandy, Hector Fix-Fierro & Mariela Morales Antoniazzi eds., 2014) at 
Table of Contents (revealing participation of many IAS insiders). 
 135.  Almonacid Arellano and others v. Chile, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
154, para. 124 (Sept. 26, 2006). 
 136.  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803); Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse 
Administratie der Belastinge, 1963 E.C.R. 1. 
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its statements on conventionality review. In later opinions, it acknowledges that 
not all judges have the power to review legislation, and thus conventionality 
review will take different forms in different states.137 However, it reads the 
Convention as requiring all constitutions to bring in Convention law so that 
state officials can directly apply it, and so that it carries supra-legislative 
status.138 
The doctrine of conventionality review contains all the main elements of 
Latin American neoconstitutionalism. It emphasizes judicial power and defines 
judges as having final say over the content of rights (strong-form review). And 
it views international human rights law as having direct effect, so that domestic 
law is always already infused with international human rights law. Further, the 
doctrine of conventionality review is an example of purposive, principled 
judicial reasoning. It is not directly mentioned in the American Convention, and 
it was not the explicit intent of its authors or of the signing states in 1969. 
Finally, the Court adds that conventionality review must refer to the Court’s 
own jurisprudence as the authoritative interpretation of the Convention, 
placing itself as the ultimate arbiter of human rights. The Court has thus read 
the American Convention through a neoconstitutionalist lens. 
A. The Neoconstitutionalist Boomerang Effect 
The doctrine of conventionality review, first announced in a judgment 
against Chile but authored by a Mexican judge, later “boomeranged” back to 
Mexico and contributed to an important shift in Mexican constitutional law and 
practice.139 Mexico accepted the Court’s jurisdiction only in 1998.140 The Court 
has since issued nine contentious judgments against Mexico, several of them 
concerning extrajudicial execution or lack of investigation by military courts 
that claim jurisdiction over crimes committed by soldiers against civilians, or 
both.141 In Radilla Pacheco v. Mexico, the Court called on Mexican courts to 
exert conventionality review.142 
In 2011, in the midst of a crisis over growing violence by both drug cartels 
and the Mexican government, Mexico passed a human rights reform to its 
constitution. The reform adapted the constitutional text to clearly state that 
international treaties come in at the constitutional level and, as in Venezuela, 
 
 137.  Jorge Contesse, ¿La Última palabra? Control de convencionalidad y posibilidades de diálogo 
con la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos 6–8 (2013) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/sela/SELA13_Contesse_CV_Sp_20130401.pdf.   
 138.  Caso Cabrera García y Montiel Flores v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C). No. 220 (Nov. 26 2010) at paras. 225–33.  
 139.  MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, supra note 129. 
 140.  Fix-Zamudio helped write the proposal for submitting this acceptance such that it won 
President Zedilla’s support. See Fix-Fierro, supra note 130, at n.181.  
 141.  See, e.g., Radilla-Pacheco v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 209, (Nov. 23, 2009). 
 142.  Id. ¶ 339. 
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trump the constitution if the treaty right is more protective.143 A year later, the 
Supreme Court of Mexico responded to the reform and to the IACtHR’s 
demand for conventionality review in Radilla Pacheco v. Mexico by ruling that 
the IACtHR’s rulings are self-executing, and that all Mexican judges—federal 
and state—have the power and the duty to review laws under either the 
American Convention or IACtHR jurisprudence, which the Supreme Court 
views as authoritative interpretations of the Convention.144 Federal judges have 
the power to strike down laws that contradict the Convention, and state judges, 
who did not have higher-law review powers prior to the Court’s decision, now 
must refrain from applying unconventional laws in the cases they hear. Within a 
short period, a dramatic judicial and constitutional change unfolded, triggered 
in part by the IACtHR’s rulings, leaving Mexican judges scrambling to learn 
Inter-American human rights law. 
The IACtHR, then, influenced by neoconstitutionalist lawyers and judges, 
has committed itself to pushing national judiciaries toward conventionality 
review. Further, through Almonacid and subsequent rulings, it has provided a 
rich resource for neoconstitutionalists to help advance their own vision of 
constitutional law in the domestic setting.145 The question remains, however, 
whether and under what conditions conventionality review will expand the 
Court’s authority. 
VII 
CONCLUSION: THE IACTHR’S VARIED AUTHORITY IN LATIN AMERICA 
The three case studies in this article suggest that the uneven spread of 
neoconstitutionalist ideas and practices across Latin America helps explain the 
various types of authority the IACtHR exerts. In Colombia, where 
neoconstitutionalist lawyers were able to successfully ally themselves with 
reformers and participate in the construction of a new constitution and court 
starting in 1991, the Court now enjoys narrow, intermediate, and extensive 
authority. In Chile, where constitutional reform was muted, and 
neoconstitutionalist doctrines have not found strong adherents in the judiciary, 
the IACtHR has achieved narrow authority and, at times, intermediate 
authority. In Venezuela, neoconstitutionalism was sidelined as the new 
Bolivarian constitutional order was forged. After Chávez centralized power and 
interfered with judicial independence, the Supreme Court adopted purposive 
theories of interpretation that advanced Chávez’s political agenda and directly 
rejected an IACtHR judgment on judicial independence in Venezuela. The 
 
 143.   For a description of the reform, see la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, Reformas 
Constitucionales en materia de Amparo y Derechos Humanos publicadas en junio de 2011, 
http://www2.scjn.gob.mx/red/constitucion/10Junio.html. 
 144.  Suprema Corte de Justicia de México, MP: Olga Sánchez Cordero, August 20, 2012, Sentencia 
133/2012 (Mexico) at 97, http://fueromilitar.scjn.gob.mx/Resoluciones/Amparo_revision_133_2012.pdf. 
 145.  See Almonacid Arellano and others v. Chile, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
154, para. 124 (Sept. 26, 2006). 
HUNEEUS_2-8 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/14/2016  2:24 PM 
206 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 79:179 
Court has thus achieved only narrow authority in Venezuela. Finally, the 
Mexican example suggests that the neoconstitutionalist movement can also 
work transnationally. Neoconstitutionalist lawyers managed to assume 
leadership roles on the IACtHR itself, using it as a vehicle to spread 
neoconstitutionalist ideas and practices. 
The fact that the Court’s authority varies by state, depending on local legal 
practices and constitutional politics, has implications for the future of the 
IACtHR. If the Court’s authority depends on the domestic constellation of 
lawyers and political reformers, the anti-Court stance of Venezuela and some of 
its allies is, perhaps, less of a threat than it might seem at first blush. 
Venezuela’s denunciation and the Dominican Republic’s recent rejection of the 
Court’s authority may cause worry that the IAS will soon come crashing down. 
But the expansion of the Court’s authority beyond judgment compliance in 
other states means that there are also deep wells of growing support.146 Further, 
these wells of support lie beyond the executive branch and outside the 
government. Where the Court establishes authority beyond judgment 
compliance, and its compliance constituencies include actors beyond the parties 
to the case, its presence likely becomes more stable.147 It is hard to imagine that 
Colombia, where the American Convention and the jurisprudence of the 
IACtHR play so salient a role in domestic politics, could withdraw from the 
American Convention and thus the Court’s jurisdiction, without domestic 
repercussions. 
These conclusions suggest several subjects for further study. For lack of 
space, this article has not examined the motives and struggles within the 
political field. In particular, the narratives do not examine the bottom-up role of 
civil society, emphasizing instead the role of legal elites. But social movements 
clearly played an important role in forming the political moments of change 
that created opportunities for neoconstitutionalism in Colombia, and in shaping 
the Venezuelan constitutional moment as well. More work is needed to explore 
the political field, to examine the role of social movements, and to reveal the 
exact ties that link neoconstitutionalists to particular political projects. 
Finally, it is important to note that the discussion thus far, pursuant to the 
typology posed by Alter, Helfer, and Madsen, focuses on type rather than on 
depth of authority. Thus, it does not analyze how much authority, or power, the 
IACtHR wields overall in a state; it tells us only how that authority is exerted, 
and through which audiences. Indeed, it is possible that in states where 
authority is extensive, an IC’s actual power is weak because the state’s capacity 
is weak.  For example, the Colombian government has a strong presence in 
major cities, but a thin presence in certain rural areas, and it is entirely absent in 
areas that have been taken over by the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
 
 146.  This point was suggested by Karen Alter. 
 147.  KAREN ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 348–49 (2014) (describing the 
role of compliance constituencies).   
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Colombia and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional, two guerrilla groups.148 
Similarly, Mexico’s turn to the IAS and human rights occurred just as the 
federal government’s loss of control over certain areas dominated by drug 
cartels became evident. In these states, civil society and the government are 
turning to the judiciary and opening doors to the international human rights 
systems because of national governments’ weaknesses. As a result, more 
audiences within the government acknowledge the IACtHR’s judgments as 
binding and take action toward implementation, and more civil society actors 
refer to the Court’s judgments as they push their governments to fulfill its 
human rights obligations. This means that the Court is beginning to exert its 
authority in different ways, and also beginning to reach a broader audience. But 
there is a paradox in that the Court gains authority in a state where the 
government is weaker and less able to stop atrocities from taking place.149 In 
other words, an important source of variation of the Court’s de facto power 
both within and among states may be government presence and capacity. And 
this is regardless of whether the Court enjoys narrow, intermediate, or extensive 
authority, or some combination of the three. 
 
 
 148.  MAURICIO GARCIA VILLEGAS & JOSE RAFAEL ESPINOSA, EL DERECHO AL ESTADO: LOS 
EFECTOS DEL APARTHEID INSTITUCIONAL EN COLOMBIA 91–93 (2013).   
 149.  Arguably, in “brown areas” where the state is absent, the Inter-American Court, too, is absent. 
See Guillermo O’Donnell, The Quality of Democracy: Why the Rule of Law Matters, 15 J. DEMOCRACY 
32, 41 (2004) (discussing brown areas). 
